Manual Israel: the First Hundred Years, Volume 3: Israeli Politics and Society since 1948

Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online Israel: the First Hundred Years, Volume 3: Israeli Politics and Society since 1948 file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with Israel: the First Hundred Years, Volume 3: Israeli Politics and Society since 1948 book. Happy reading Israel: the First Hundred Years, Volume 3: Israeli Politics and Society since 1948 Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF Israel: the First Hundred Years, Volume 3: Israeli Politics and Society since 1948 at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF Israel: the First Hundred Years, Volume 3: Israeli Politics and Society since 1948 Pocket Guide.

United States: funding, training, weaponry. Today, the Israeli Military is present on all kinds of social networks Twitter, Facebook, Instagram , and diffuses its messages in Hebrew but also English, Arabic, French, Russian, etc. Their communication strategy, both domestic and international significantly developed during the Gaza War of , and the wide international criticsim that stemmed from the disproportionality of the military engagement.

Account Options

Since its establishment, which followed the emergence of Israel, the Israeli Military has been subjected to recurrent, and some may even say systematic, situations threatening national security. Even following the July Armistice, the Israeli Military has been almost constantly solicited to respond to security threats from a wide spectrum extending from border infiltrations to full-out military engagement.

In less than 70 years of existence, the Israeli Military has engaged in more than 10 full-scale military confrontations, both conventional and unconventional. The relative calm between the two major wars allowed the IDF to develop and grow. As further developed previously, the Israeli Military was marked by the shift of the nature of regional threats. In and the Israeli Military launched air and ground operations against Palestinian non-State armed actors in Lebanon, and remained stationed in the southern region of the country, to protect its border, until Unconventional threats increased as exemplified by the first and second intifadas of and , and the second Lebanon war against the Hezbollah.

Why are some Arabs boycotting Israel's elections?

Regardless, the Israeli military establishment has been a central pillar in the nation-building process of the country. As exemplified by the aforementioned three-tier system, and the socialisation and integration roles of the Israeli Military, no barrier exists between the civilian and military spheres. With its regional environment perceived as highly hostile, and its need to compensate for its demographic inferiority, the military might of the country, embodied in the Israeli Military, has always been considered as essential to the survival of the nation and its people.

By basing the Israeli Military on mass conscription, citizenship and soldiering are institutionally linked in Israel. However, with the growth of liberalism and individualism in the Israeli society from the s, the national cohesion and public consensus surrounding the Israeli Military started to erode. UN Resolution disengagement from Lebanon following the war.

They know where to find us.


  • Numéros en texte intégral?
  • Israeli Military.
  • The Gandhi Story.

The major Arab states rejected the principles of Resolution , and announced their policy towards Israel—the three Nos: No recognition, no peace, no negotiations. Israel became the occupier of an angry and unhappy population. Living under occupation is terrible for the occupied. It is not a blessing for the occupier. He was invited to speak at a Labor Party meeting and arrived late, in traditional kibbutznik style, in shorts.

He astounded everyone by saying that if Israel did not immediately return all the territory it had just captured, with the exception of East Jerusalem, it would be heading for a historic disaster. Given the consequence all these years later, the loss of Israeli lives, the increasing demonization of Israel in the Arab press and in some parts of the world press, and to some degree in world opinion, in addition to the intifadas, the great suffering and humiliation of the Palestinians, the damage to the lives of both sides, it is becoming increasingly clear that Ben Gurion was right.

He had the foresight to see that time passing only made it more difficult for Israel to protect its citizens and maintain control over a huge angry population. This is a cycle of violence and despair. For Israel the situation is a trap. Israel cannot stay without creeping annexation that includes more Arabs into Israeli society—the demographic issue—or leave, certainly not easily with all its many settlers.

Also, what happens to the millions of Palestinians in the West Bank? Can they become citizens of Israel? Now, in Israel there is much discussion of the demographic dilemma. To shore up his faltering government he turned sharply to the right and chose a hard liner, Avigdor Lieberman, for the cabinet.

Lieberman is known for his extremely hawkish views. At one time he called for stripping Israeli Arabs of citizenship. This kind of talk makes an impossible situation even more impossible, if that is possible. A two state solution seems like the way to go. The first map outlining borders proposed by Israel has often been cited by the Palestinians as a ridiculous offer—a Bantustan plan of non-contiguous cantons, giving the Palestinians nothing that could be called a state.

People have been left with the impression that this was the Israeli position. It was the most reasonable deal to date, but it was rejected by Arafat. There were some weaknesses in the deal—for example—ambiguity over control of the air space over the projected Palestinian state.

Israel: The First Hundred Years

The real weakness was that the Barak coalition had unravelled and he was now in a minority in the Knesset. However, even if the plan had not been approved by the Knesset, it could have become a signpost for a projected peace and a basis of hopes for the future, the signalling of a willingness to seriously negotiate the peace that both sides really need. Arafat rejected the plan and made no counter-offer.

Sharon was elected, and the intifada broke out. Clinton stated that the plan broke down essentially about the right of return of the refugees.

Israel’s War on Culture

Arafat told Clinton that if he accepted, Clinton could attend his funeral. Perhaps what is most important for the understanding of the conflict is that the plan clearly calls for a final resolution and an end to any further claims. This is the psychological sticking point for the Palestinians. They are interested in their concept of peace and justice—a vindication of their grievance. Unlike Israelis who are very tough negotiators, but also pragmatic and interested in solutions.

Palestinians and Arab leaders take no responsibility for the disaster they have brought on their own people, both by the ineptness of their leadership and the autocracy and corruption of their governments.

The election of Hamas was in part a reproach to the corruption of the Palestinian National Authority and in part because of the political ineptness of the Abbas party who ran too many candidates against a well-organized religious fundamentalist party with only a few candidates. Hamas, in spite of its charitable record, since they are responsible for much of the social services Palestinians get, still did not win a majority in the popular vote.

However, both Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, are ideologically and religiously opposed to any kind of agreement on a political solution. They believe that Palestine, as stated in their charter, belongs entirely to Moslems.

To relinquish any part of the land is forbidden. Some Orthodox Jews have a similar belief. God promised this land to the Jews and no one can give it up. Yet it has become clear that a military solution is impossible. Even worse—ongoing conflict is becoming ever more dangerous. Whatever the average Israeli and Palestinian thinks about a two-state solution, the constant violence supported and maintained by arms shipments allows extremists to sabotage any deal, even as it begins to take place.

Given the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and failure of the many attempts at negotiations, I have come to the reluctant conclusion that both sides cannot come to an agreement by themselves. There is no military solution. Neither side can impose its will on the other.

All further hostilities will only inflict more cruelty on both peoples. A political solution must be found, and can only happen with concerted international action. The US, which at one time had the credibility to appear as an honest broker, has lost this power since its entanglement in Iraq.

The need for participation by the Arab League is absolutely necessary.

Israel’s Demography Has a Unique History

Once, in , they proposed a vague initiative. As the situation becomes more and more threatening and dangerous, because of the availability of sophisticated long distance weapons, they may become more willing to participate in negotiations. In fact, they have recently shown renewed interest. Growing Shiite radicalism threatens the Sunni governments. Rage against Israel can rebound against these same governments.

Unsettling wars in this area could create economic havoc. From the Israeli point of view, the acknowledgement of the limits of military power could influence Israel if there was a real chance of an agreement. The outlines of a reasonable agreement are fairly clear from the implementation of Resolution and the Clinton parameters of Is pressure likely to be more effective now?

In the recent hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the US was at first reluctant to demand an immediate ceasefire to give Israel time to control Hezbollah. When the situation looked as if it might spiral out of control, the major powers in the Security Council were able to act decisively and effectively to bring peacekeepers into the area.

Prof. Benyamin Neuberger

This demonstrates how the major powers in the Security Council can impose solutions if they choose. They may decide to do so in the Arab-Israeli conflict if they think the situation in the region is becoming too unstable and too dangerous. There is some good reason for this. The weapons involved are becoming more and more sophisticated, with potential to ignite a regional war and create chaos.

Item is in your Cart

One proposal is to put UN peacekeepers in the West Bank. Each side is confronted with a contradictory version of history. Each page is divided into three: the Palestinian and Israeli narratives, and a third section left blank for the pupil to fill in. In France it has sold more than 23, copies. It has also been adapted for use for the Macedonian-Albanian narratives.

There have been great difficulties in introducing the booklets into Palestinian and Israeli high schools.


  • 1st Edition?
  • War over Peace by Uri Ben-Eliezer - Hardcover - University of California Press;
  • Colonial Women: Race and Culture in Stuart Drama.
  • What is History For?.
  • I Have AIDS!?

However, more and more people in these communitiies are urging a change in the teaching of history. The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited. Csmbridge: Cambridge University Press. Patai, R. The complete diariesof Theodor Herzl vols.